China’s leaders perceive the recent Wagnerian drama in Russia as an opportunity for Russia to learn from China’s political control over armed forces. Beijing scholars emphasize the wisdom of China’s Communist Party founders who enforced top-down control from the early days of the revolution. This article explores China’s stance and its implications in the context of the ongoing crisis in Russia.

China’s Complacency: Contrary to expectations, China’s officials exhibit a sense of complacency rather than self-doubt in the face of turbulence in Russia. Despite a written agreement of unlimited friendship between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, China’s diplomats and propagandists blame the West for the conflict in Ukraine. While this script damages China’s image in Western capitals, China stands by Putin, emphasizing their united contempt for the West and belief in the restoration of an older world order.

China’s Perception of the Bond: China and Russia share a common disdain for the West and its democratic norms. While Chinese officials acknowledge Russia’s occasional recklessness, they view the struggle for dominance as a long-term endeavor. The goal is to drive the West away from the global center stage eventually, with each country bringing different tools and techniques to the fight.

Chinese Response to Wagner Group’s Mutiny: Chinese censors and propaganda authorities allowed relatively unfiltered reports about the Wagner Group’s mutiny to reach the Chinese public. While official media treated it as Russia’s internal affair, online outlets and commentators were less cautious, discussing Yevgeny Prigozhin’s allegations of corruption in Russia’s high command. This apparent openness indicates China’s preparedness for potential outcomes if Putin’s troubles persist, but it also reflects a lack of panic among Chinese leadership.

China’s Confidence in Political Control: China’s confidence in its approach to political control is reinforced by recent events. Scholars point to Mao’s imposition of party cells and commissars on the Red Army during the revolution, emphasizing the PLA’s continuation of this tradition. The Chinese leadership views the Wagner Group’s use of mercenaries as evidence that outsourcing power projection can lead to issues, unlike in China where such practices would be unacceptable.

Different Business Models: China employs private security companies primarily to safeguard its nationals working in dangerous regions due to the Belt and Road Initiative. While Chinese private security companies engage in quasi-military tasks using unarmed personnel, Russian private military companies like the Wagner Group profit from chaos and violence, reflecting their distinct business model.

China’s Broader Goals: China’s support for Putin’s actions in Ukraine stems from larger objectives rather than a direct alignment with his reckless behavior. China hopes for a war that exhausts the West, leaving it weakened and divided. In this context, some chaos in Russia is forgivable for Chinese leaders, as long as the endgame weakens the West.

Conclusion: China’s perception of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny reflects its confidence in its own approach to political control. While observing Russia’s turmoil, Chinese officials remain steadfast in their support for Putin and their larger goal of displacing the West from global dominance. By analyzing the Wagnerian drama, China sees an opportunity for Russia to learn from its example and strengthen its political control over armed forces.

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